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ASHER D. GRUNIS*

The United Nations and
Human Rights in the Israel
Occupied Territoriest
The Middle-East and the Israel-Arab conflict have, for many years, been
under constant consideration in the United Nations and on the agenda of
its various organs. Since the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of certain
territories of Syria, Jordan and Egypt, the United Nations has also been
concerned with the question of human rights of the indigenous population
in the occupied territories. In this article, the author will attempt to describe the actions of the United Nations with regard to human rights in the
area, and analyze the performance of the various United Nations bodies
involved in the quest for human rights in the Middle East.
The article will deal mainly with the procedural and institutional deficiencies which, as will be seen, have permeated almost every action taken
by the United Nations with regard to human rights in the occupied territories. The author will attempt to show that the United Nations has missed
a unique opportunity to contribute to the development of the international
law of human rights, and especially to the evolution of machinery for the
implementation of the substantive norms of human rights.
Human Rights is a comparatively new chapter in international law, and
has been developing rapidly since the adoption of the Charter of the United
Nations. This development has been devoted almost exclusively to the
formulation of substantive norms, which mirrored the expectations of the
international community. While substantive norms are now an accepted
part of international law, and are continuing to be recognized as such, the
development of procedures and machinery to ensure actual compliance
with the substantive norms has been slow. It is in this context that one
should appraise and evaluate the performance of the United Nations with
regard to alleged violations of human rights in the Middle East-especially
*LL.B, 1968 (Jerusalem); LL.M., 1972 (Virginia); Member of the Israel Bar.
tThis article and the following one by Dr. Meguid should be read together.
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so because this was one of the first attempts by the world organization to
investigate such purported violations.'
I
Immediately following the Israeli victory in the 1967 war, the Security
Council passed a resolution which recommended to the governments involved "the scrupulous respect of humanitarian principles governing the
treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time
of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949."2 The
resolution asked the Secretary General "to follow the effective implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council."
The first step taken by the Secretary General was to ask the Commissioner General of UNRWA to report to him on the situation. However, the
Secretary General came to the conclusion that he should rely on other
machinery3 and on July 6, 1967, he appointed Mr. Nils Gussing to be his
special representative on this matter and sent Mr. Gussing to the Middle
East. Mr. Gussing travelled in the area, met with responsible officials of the
governments involved and submitted a report to the Secretary General,
who later published a report based on Mr. Gussing's findings. 4
During the Gussing tour, Israel raised the question of ill-treatment of
Jews in the Arab countries, and since then Israel has repeatedly demanded
that any investigation of alleged violations of human rights in the area
should also encompass the treatment of Jews in these countries. The Arab
countries objected to such an inquiry and the United Nations did not make
any attempt to pursue the issue. Israel has made this a pre-condition for its
cooperation with any investigatory body designed to inquire into alleged
violations of human rights in the occupied territories. 5 The Secretary General tried to send another representative to the area but Israel refused to
cooperate, giving the above reason. The Secretary General did not pursue
the matter further.
The next attempt by a United Nations organ to investigate violations of
human rights in the Middle East came during the 23rd session of the
General Assembly. On December 19, 1968, the General Assembly
'For other instances of investigations by the United Nations, of alleged violations of
human rights see J. CAREY, U.N. PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, chapters IX
and X (1970) [hereinafter cited as CAREY]. See also Ermacora, International Enquiry Commissions in the Field of Human Rights, I HUMAN RIGHTS J. 180 (1968).
2Res. 237 (1967).
3For the reasons see U.N. Doc. S/8021, at 3.
4
U.N. Doc. S/8158.
'For a detailed description of developments regarding the Israeli demand and legal
analysis of its merits see Rodley, The United Nations and Human Rights in the Middle East,
38 SOCIAL RESEARCH 217, 223 et seq. (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rodley].
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adopted a resolution establishing a "Special Committee to Investigate
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the
6
Occupied Territories" (hereinafter referred to as the Special Committee).
The same resolution took note of a previous resolution by the International
Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran in April-May, 1968, and
cited the Teheran resolution, including, inter alia, the passage of the Teheran resolution which "express[ed] grave concern at the violation of human
rights in Arab territories occupied by Israel."
The General Assembly itself did not appoint the members of the Special
Committee, but requested the President of the Assembly to appoint three
member States to serve on that body. The President, Dr. Emilio Arenales
of Guatemala, made efforts to find States who would agree to serve on the
Special Committee but to no avail. Before completing his task Dr. Arenales died. A meeting of the Vice-Presidents of the 23rd session of the
General Assembly decided to delegate the power of appointment to one of
7
their number, Dr. Luis Alvarado, of Peru.
Dr. Alvarado approached member States who had taken a neutral position in the Israel-Arab conflict, and who had not voted for the resolution
establishing the Special Committee, but who had abstained. He could not
find any such State which would agree to serve on the Committee. Having
such limited choice, he appointed on September 12, 1969, Ceylon, Somalia
and Yugoslavia to be members of the Special Committee. As will be noted
hereunder, these countries were totally biased, and had preconceived notions regarding right and wrong in the Middle East conflict.
During the period between the General Assembly resolution establishing
the Special Committee, and the actual appointment of its members, another
United Nations organ initiated an investigation into alleged violations of
human rights in the occupied territories. On March 6, 1969, the Human
Rights Commission decided to establish a Special Working Group of Experts (hereinafter referred to as the Group of Experts), to "investigate
allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention regarding the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War." 8 The resolution in a preceding paragraph deplored "Israel's continued violations of
6

7Res. 2443 (XXIII).

lsrael cast serious doubts as to the propriety of this procedures by which one of the
Vice-Presidents was entrusted with the task of appointing the members of the Special
Committee. For the developments involving this issue see

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COM-

MITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE POPULATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, U.N. Doc. A/8089, at 9 et seq. For legal assessment

of the Israeli objection to the prodecure see Rodley, supra note 5, at 23 1-32, and Bender, Ad
Hoc Committees and Human Rights Investigations: A Comparative Case Study in the
Middle East, 38 SOCIAL RESEARCH 241, 247- 48 (197 1) [hereinafter cited as Bender].
aRes. 6 (XXV).
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human rights in the occupied territories .... ,, The appointments to this

body were based, not on states but on individuals, and the people serving
as the Group of Experts came from the following six countries: Senegal,
Austria, Peru, India, Tanzania and Yugoslavia.10 Some were the representatives of their governments on the Human Rights Commission.
The two investigatory bodies travelled extensively in Arab countries,
seeking evidence regarding the alleged violations. Israel refused to cooperate with both groups and advanced two reasons for its policy of

non-cooperation: First, the unwillingness of the United Nations to investigate the situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries;
second, the apparent bias of the two bodies, and the fact that the two

organs establishing them have pre-judged the outcome of the investigations."'
The two bodies published reports highly critical of Israel, accusing it of
numerous violations of human rights, ranging from mass deportations to
illegal internment, and from demolition of thousands of dwellings and
whole villages to ill-treatment and torture of prisoners. 12 On the basis of

these findings, the Human Rights Commission reached a new peak when it
adopted a resolution on March 22, 1972, accusing Israel of committing war

crimes.

13

II
The most desirable feature in an investigatory body, like the Special
Committee and the Group of Experts, is impartiality and lack of tenden9
1t is interesting to note the voting on the resolution establishing the Group of Experts.
Only 13 votes were cast for the resolution (less than a majority), one was against and 16
abstained. More illuminating is the list of States which voted for the resolution: all Arab
countries, members of the Soviet bloc or ardent supporters of the Arab cause: Mauritania,
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Ukrania, Soviet Union, United Arab Republic (Egypt),
Tanzania, Yugoslavia, India, Iran and Lebanon. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 1014 at 23.
10
Actually the Human Rights Commission decided that the Working Group was to be
composed of the same people who had previously served on the inquiring body, which had
previously investigated the allegations of violations of human rights in South Africa.
"See, e.g., the Israel response to the report of the Special Committee, U.N. Doc.
A/8164. See also the remarks by the Attorney General of Israel, Mr. M. Shamgar, in the
International Symposium on Human Rights held in Tel-Aviv. University on July 1971, 1

ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 382 (1971).

' 2The report of the Group of Experts is U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1016. The Special Committee published its first report in October 1970, U.N. Doc. A/8089. The General Assembly,
in its 25th session, asked the Special Committee "to report to the Secretary General as soon
as possible and whenever the need arises" (Resolution 2727 (XXV))). In pursuance of this
resolution, the Special Committee submitted a second report in September 1971 (U.N. Doc.
A/8389 and Corr. I).
13
New York Times, March 24, 1972, at 70. Again the vote was by less than a majority of
the 32-member Commission; 15 members voted for, 4 against and II abstained. Quite
typically the sponsors of the resolution were two Arab countries (Egypt and Lebanon), and a
country which has always supported the Arabs in the Middle East conflict (Tanzania). The
Jerusalem Post, March 24, 1972, at 2.
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tiousness. It is not surprising that the Secretary General remarked when
speaking on human rights in armed conflicts, that
an absolute prerequisite for the establishment and success of such an agency
[to ensure and supervise the observance of human rights] would be that its
character would be exclusively and strictly humanitarian; it would have to be
scrupulously non-political and it should
strive to offer all guarantees of
14
impartiality, efficiency and rectitude.
The importance of impartiality is twofold, and is captured in the saying
that justice should not only be done but should also be seen to be done.
First, impartiality ensures that the investigator will not be influenced by
extraneous consideration in his quest for the truth and the ascertainment of
the actual facts. Second, impartiality is a pre-condition for the efficacy of
the judgment reached by the investigator. This is especially true with
regard to international investigations concerning violations of human rights.
It is clear that in the present state of international law and international
relations, there is little chance that an investigation into alleged violations
of human rights, such as the two conducted into Israeli occupation, will
lead to enforcement measures and sanctions against the offending State.
The conclusions and recommendations of the investigatory body will be
complied with by the government involved, at least partially, only if enough
pressure is exerted by world opinion. Such a pressure may be of two kinds:
(1) by governments which have normal relations with the offending State,
15
and (2) by the mass media.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Israel has violated the human
rights of the population in the occupied territories. In such a case, countries like Britain or the United States can exert political pressure on Israel
to desist from such violations. Poland, for example, which does not have
diplomatic relations with Israel, and which supports the Arabs wholeheartedly, would have little influence over, or credibility with, the Israeli
Government. The same goes to the mass media in the Western world. It
can exert some pressure on Israel. If, however, the investigatory body is
completely one-sided and biased, there is no chance that those having the
capacity to influence the decision-making process in Israel will take any
action in that direction.
The performance of the United Nations concerning the issue of human
rights in the occupied territories, has been blemished with so many irregularities that it is no wonder, and completely understandable, that Israel
has refused to cooperate with the two investigations, and also refused to
4

1 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL,

RESPECT

FOR HUMAN

RIGHTS IN ARMED

U.N. Doc. A/8052, at 77. The General Assembly stressed the importance of
impartiality
in fact-finding. Res. 2329 (XXII).
15
Pressure by mass media would be particularly effective in countries having democratic
regimes. This is,of course, the case of Israel.
CONFLICTS,
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take their reports seriously. Israel's ability to ignore the conclusions of the

United Nations investigations was supported by an understandable lack of
world public opinion on behalf of their findings.
III
The first instance of bias is to be found in the resolutions establishing the
Special Committee and the Group of Experts. The General Assembly and

the Human Rights Commission denounced Israel in the same resolutions
which initiated the investigations. 16 Professor Y. Dinstein of Tel-Aviv

Law School described this process thus: "First verdict is pronounced; then
the jury weighs the evidence and finally the parties are supposed to present
17
their respective cases."1 , 18
The second example of lack of impartiality concerns the composition of

the two bodies, especially the Special Committee. The members of the
Special Committee, Somalia, Yugoslavia and Ceylon do not have diplomat-

ic relations with Israel, and have continuously supported the Arab cause in
the International arena. Some facts will substantiate this assertion.
The Foreign Minister of Somalia has declared that his country was in a
state of war with Israel and that it was "in the frontline with regard to
whatever concerns the Arab cause."' 9 President Tito of Yugoslavia did not
go so far, but simply stated that "we [the Yugolavs] are on the side of the
Arabs." 20 And the Yugoslav representatives on the Human Rights Com-

mission, after being criticized by Israel for his bias, did not hesitate to
respond by saying that Yugoslavia condemns most strongly the Israeli
aggression and occupation. 2' Yugoslavia was one of the countries which
severed diplomatic relations with Israel upon the outbreak of the 1967
war.

22

Israel had diplomatic relations with Ceylon even after the war, but in

June, 1970, a new r6gime assumed power in that country, and it decided to
16See pp. 3, 5 supra. The General Assembly did so only by reference to a previous
resolution of the International Conference on Human Rights, while the Human Rights
Commission
explicitly castigated Israel for violating human rights.
17Dinstein, Israel's Benign Occupation, The Jerusalem Post, June 2, 1972 (Magazine), at
6. See also Rodley, supra note 5,at 230, 235-36; Bender, supra note 7,at 245-46, 251, and
supra note 1,at 109.

CAREY,
8

' 1t should be noted that the same procedure, first judgment and then investigation,

characterized the actions of the Human Rights Commission with regard to violations of
human rights in Sotth Africa. See CAREY, supra note I, at 99.
"9A report by the Middle East News Agency of May 3, 1970, cited in a letter from the
permanent representative of Israel to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/7984.
2"Cited in a letter from the permanent representative of Israel to the Secretary General,
U.N. Doc. A/7895.
21U.N. Doc. E/C N.4/SR. 1079, at 102. See also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 1075, at 52, and
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 1080, at 114.
22AII the countries belonging to the Soviet bloc which had diplomatic relations with
Israel, except Rumania, took the same action.
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break diplomatic relations with Israel. In announcing this move, the Ceylon Government stated that diplomatic relations with Israel would be
suspended until Israel accepts the resolutions of the Security Council and
withdraws from the occupied territories, or until a solution acceptable to
23
the Arabs is reached.
The apparent bias and tendentiousness of the investigations is evidenced, without using any extrinsic evidence, in the reports which they
have published. Only one example need be cited: the case of Moayyad
Badawi EI-Bahsh. This man appeared before the Special Committee, and
claimed that a paralysis in his left arm had been caused by ill-treatment in
an Israli prison. He asserted that he had been tortured by electric shocks,
and that in one case he had been suspended from a window and that an
Israeli soldier jumped on the shackles which had held his legs, thus causing
24
the paralysis.
In a report submitted by Israel to Amnesty International (with whom
Israel cooperates), after that organization had asked for Israel's response
to the allegations by EI-Bahsh, Israeli doctors diagnosed the case of
El-Bahsh as that of hysterical paralysis caused by mental disturbance. The
25
Special Committee had before it the Israeli response, but it would not
accept a report by Israeli physicians.
However, EI-Bahsh was also examined in London by two impartial
British doctors. 26 One doctor concluded that he suffered from hysterical
paralysis and the other diagnosed the case as either hysterical or feigned
paralysis. 2 7 Even after such a diagnosis by an objective medical examination, the Special Committee declared that it "[c]annot, however, rule out
the possibility that paralysis was due to a mental state that was itself the
result of some form of physical ill-treatment or psychological strain while
under detention." 2 8 To justify its previous findings, and unwilling to retract
and admit a mistake, the Special Committee advanced a new theory unsubstantiated by any proof (even the story of EI-Bahsh himself) of psychological pressure or physical ill-treatment as a cause of a dubious paralysis.
It is clear from the whole process of investigating the alleged violations
of human rights in the Israeli occupied territories, from the outset when the
"See letter dated June 18, 1970 from the permanent representative of Israel to the
General, U.N. Doc. A/7986.
Secretary
24
U.N. Doc. A/8389 and Corr. 1, at 48-9 and U.N. Doc. A/8389 Add. 1, at 12. A
different version of the cause of the paralysis appears in the Special Committee's first report.

Doc. A/8089, at 37.
See U.N.
25
Israel, as pointed out earlier, did not cooperate with the investigatory bodies, and the
Committee received the Israel answer from Amnesty International.
Special
26
U.N. Doc. A/8389 Add. 1, at 13.
271d.
28id.
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IV
two bodies were established until their reports were published, that it was
highly politicized, and lacked the necessary traits of a quasi-judicial inquiry, of impartiality and objectivity. 29 Even if Israel violated the human
rights of the population in the occupied territories (an allegation strongly
denied by Israel), the reports of the Special Committee and the Group of
Experts did not have any effect on the Israeli policies, neither directly nor
indirectly through pressure by world opinion.
The United Nations actions in this matter are an impotent and abortive
exercise in political polemics, instead of genuine interest in human rights.
An English observer defined the attitude of the United Nations with regard
to another issue of human rights in words that are appropriate here. He
said:
It is a story of political muddle and dishonesty, and a failure to show real
30
concern for human rights.

If the United Nations is really interested in protecting individuals from
human-rights violations (which occur every day throughout the world), it
should pay heed to all allegations of such violations. It should not use a
double standard by which only certain violations in particular countries
attract its attention. The United Nations should refrain from passing judgment before investigating allegations of violations of human rights. It
should move from an ad hoc approach to the establishment of a permanent
body whose function would be to investigate such violations, thus ensuring
31
greater impartiality.
It should include in the investigatory bodies, individuals by virtue of
their personal virtues rather than States and their representative. 32 And it
should not include in such bodies States or nationals of States which take
sides with regard to the country involved.33 Only by following such a path
can the United Nations contribute to the worthy quest for human rights in
the world community.
9

2 1t is interesting to note that the Special Committee remarked that it saw its function as

humanitarian and not political, and that it did not involve itself in the political conflict. U.N.

Doc. 3A/8389
and Corr. 1,at 56.
0

Fawcett, The Role of the United Nations in the Protection of Human Rights-Is It
Misconceived?, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 95, 100 (A. Eide & A.
Schou ed. 1968).
3

'See

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED

CONFLICTS, U.N. Doc. A/8052, at 77. See also Note, UN Fact-Finding as a Means of
Settling
Disputes, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 154, 175 (1969).
32
Clearly bodies composed of States will tend to be more politicized. P. DROST, HUMAN
RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS 135 (1951).
33
1n peace-observation operations by the United Nations, the practice was not to include

in them nationals of the government which was hostile to one of the parties concerned. D.
WAINHOUSE, INTERNATIONAL PEACE OBSERVATION 584 (1966).
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